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The U.S. automobile industry is highly concentrated  (three firms account for 
the great bulk of  automobile manufacturing  in the United  States), employs a 
large number of people (over 300,000  in 1978),  and has major production facil- 
ities in many states (major assembly plants in twelve states and suppliers in 
virtually every state). The work force is highly organized and represented by a 
politically active union (the United Auto Workers  [UAW]), and each of the 
majors maintains an individual lobbying presence in Washington as well as a 
collective  presence  via  the  Motor  Vehicle  Manufacturers’  Association 
(MVMA). When  one  adds  the  intangible  effect  of  the  strong  attachment 
Americans have to the automobile and the perception of its place in modern 
American economic development, it is clear that this industry meets virtually 
everyone’s conditions for effective political power. In the late 1970s,  faced with 
slumping sales and profits, rising labor costs, and increased import competi- 
tion, the industry actively pursued,  and ultimately received, protection  from 
Japanese import competition in the form of a voluntary export restraint (VER). 
At this level of detail, the story seems to be easily rationalized by the simplest 
form of  short-run, profit-seeking political economy (e.g.,  Chicago school or 
instrumentalist Marxist). A more detailed study, however, suggests that the re- 
ality is considerably more complex. 
Simple political-economy models assume that 
1. agents (e.g., firms, factor owners, consumers) are rational in the sense that 
they know how the world works and pursue their self-interests by allocating 
resources  between  economic and  political  activities  so as  to maximize 
their wealth:’ 
Douglas R. Nelson is associate professor of  economics at Tulane University. 
I. More sophisticated theoretical  models emphasize maximization of u*e(fare.  However, since 
this is not a particularly operational concept, we follow the general strategy of emphasizing wealth 
as the goal of economic and political-economic activity. 
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2. the political-economic environment is  simple and transparent, in particu- 
lar. that 
the economic environment is simple, nonstochastic, and understood by 
all participants and analysts, 
“Money talks” is a satisfactory general model of  the political process, 
which is generally taken to be nonstochastic, 
political structure, both with respect to particular decisions and the gen- 
eral environment of the decision, is of second-order analytical impor- 
tance compared with the balance of political pressure. 
3.  points 1 and 2 imply a simple methodological rule: economic outcomes are 
informative with respect to the political intentions of agents. Thus, identify 
the gainers and assert that their political action caused the policy.2 
Point  1 seems unproblematic, and probably unavoidable in any systematic 
study of political or economic action. However, it is hard to make the politics 
of the auto VER fit easily within the analytical confines of point 2, with the 
implication that the methodological program following point 2 is seriously un- 
dermined. This paper briefly argues that the automobile industry (or at least 
most of it) successfully pursued a protectionist trade policy agenda, and that 
the immediate  economic return  on that agenda was small and known to be 
small, but that the political (and longer-run economic) return was potentially 
large, though risky. Furthermore, we will conclude by arguing that the industry 
failed in this larger political strategy. 
3.1  Getting Protection 
The exceptionally powerful position of the U.S. automobile industry in the 
U.S. political-economic structure does not imply that the industry can achieve 
any conceivable goal, or even that it can achieve a very modest goal with cer- 
tainty. In addition to the (usually weak) direct resistance from those interests 
directly harmed by government intervention on behalf of a particular industry, 
political structure, political norms, and, at least in the case of trade policy, 
the international commitments of the executive branch all put constraints on 
particularistic  outcome^.^  In  addition, the complex relationships between  is- 
sues and between branches (and subbranches) of government render certainty 
with respect to significant outcomes virtually impossible. As a result, the polit- 
ical strategies, even of the very powerful, reflect these constraints in both the 
choice of goals to pursue and in the allocation of resources across venues and 
over time. Both the power of the auto industry and the constraints imposed by 
2. Stigler (1975) suggests that we “look,  as precisely and carefully as we can, at who gains and 
who loses, and how much, when we seek to explain a regulatory policy” so that “the truly intended 
effects can be deduced from the actual effects.” 
3. This is, of  course, why particularistic  interests generally invest considerable effort in  the 
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political  and economic structures are well illustrated in the case of the  1981 
automobile VER with Japan. 
We begin with the institutional constraints. The first step in most protection 
seeking involves  some form  of  administered  protection,  the  most common 
form of which is one of the Title 7 mechanisms (i.e., antidumping and counter- 
vailing duty procedures). However, politically powerful industries often pursue 
a strategy in which the administered protection process is only the first step in 
a more involved political process. In these cases, the administrative mechanism 
of choice is often the escape clause mechanism and in the auto case Ford and 
the UAW filed an escape clause suit with the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) in June 1980.4 In addition to whatever direct pressure the industry might 
bring to bear on the executive, an essential part of the high-track political strat- 
egy is mobilization  of congressional support. Thus, even before filing the es- 
cape clause suit, the industry actively promoted congressional hearings on auto 
industry trade, which the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on 
Ways and Means commenced in March  1980. In fact, the ITC, on a three-to- 
two vote, determined that foreign vehicles were “not being imported into the 
United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious 
injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industries producing articles like 
or directly competitive with the imported articles” (USITC 1980). 
While surprising to many, the ITC’s negative injury determination was not 
the end of protection seeking on the political track, rather the emphasis shifted 
to an even greater focus on the executive via direct lobbying, and indirect pres- 
sure through public opinion and Congress. The very visible and public diffi- 
culties of the auto industry combined with a growing bilateral trade deficit in 
U.S.-Japan trade created fertile ground for public claims of unfair trading prac- 
tices in autos. Trade policy was beginning to emerge as an attractive issue for 
political entrepreneurs after a hiatus of half a century, and two of the first entre- 
preneurs to recognize its potential  were Senators John Danforth  and Lloyd 
Bentsen, who introduced legislation to quantitatively restrict auto imports in 
February  1981. Probably the most significant political change in the period 
following the  filing, and ultimate failure, of  the escape clause petition was 
Ronald Reagan’s defeat of Jimmy Carter in the 1980  presidential election. Un- 
like the Carter administration, the new Reagan administration lacked a strong 
commitment to trade liberalization as an issue and proved to be considerably 
more willing to consider trade protection as a policy response to an industry’s 
4. This refers to Section 201 of the Trade Act of  1974, which permits the U.S. government, 
under Article 19 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to provide protection to 
producers that are “seriously injured” or “threatened with serious injury’’ by  increased imports. 
If  the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that such injury has occurred, it 
recommends an action to the president, who then must decide whether to accept the ITC’s recom- 
mendation, take some other action, or do nothing. Finger, Hall, and Nelson (1982) argue that the 
escape clause mechanism has functioned as part of  a political track to protection, while the Title 
7 mechanisms constitute a technical track. Nelson (1989) presents a detailed analysis of the politi- 
cal track for the case of the auto industry. 38  Douglas R. Nelson 
problems than had the Carter admini~tration.~  Faced with both domestic (e.g., 
tax reform) and international (e.g., anticommunism and national security) is- 
sues that it considered more pressing, the Reagan administration chose to cede 
dominance on the  trade  issue to Congress. Thus the  Reagan  administration 
chose to respond to industry and congressional pressure on the auto issue by 
negotiating a voluntary export restraint with Japan. 
Interestingly, the administration’s rhetorical commitment to free markets did 
produce some difficulties in its negotiations with Japan over the VER. Specifi- 
cally, the administration refused to be seen as publicly demanding such restric- 
tion  and, in particular,  as naming a particular  level of  restraint. Ultimately, 
however, following a “nonauto-related” trip to Japan by U.S. Trade Represen- 
tative Brock in March 198  1, the Japanese government announced that it would 
voluntarily restrict exports of automobiles to the United States to 1.68 million 
units (a reduction of 7.7 percent on the previous period) for the first year of a 
three-year agreement, with some unspecified growth in the next two years. In 
the event, given the continued poor performance of the U.S. industry, the Japa- 
nese government retained the limit through all three years. 
The story to this point is fully consistent with the simple political-economy 
model sketched in the introduction: a well-organized, politically powerful in- 
dustry identified a politically feasible goal, pursued it effectively, and was suc- 
cessful. So far, so good. Unfortunately, when we look at the payoff, the litmus 
test for the Chicago school model, the account begins to break down. 
3.2  The Economic Effects of Automobile Protection 
The standard approach to evaluating the welfare effects of the VER involves 
a straightforward extension of the textbook partial equilibrium analysis of tri- 
angles and rectangles. The basic strategy  takes observed price and quantity 
data as equilibrium values and explicit assumptions on functional forms and 
estimates of elasticities of demand and supply. Under a variety of assumptions 
on elasticities and cross-elasticities, as well as the initial state of demand, these 
studies yield estimates of  consumer costs from $1 to nearly $6 billion, con- 
sumer costs per job saved ranging from $95,000 to $220,000, and increases in 
domestic profit and rent transfers to Japanese firms both  on the order of  $2 
billion.h As a result of  the continuing recession, the estimates for the years 
immediately following the imposition of the VRA are consistently lower than 
those for later years. 
The research that generates such estimates is essentially static in nature; it 
5. Trade proves to be an interesting litmus test of an administration’s orientation, whether pro- 
market or probusiness. Where the Carter administration showed a strong promarket orientation in 
trade as well as regulation, at  least on trade the Reagan administration was clearly more pro- 
business. 
6.  See Case M-22 (Automobiles) in  Hufbauer, Berliner, and  Elliott (1986) for a convenient 
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does not address the more difficult question of the effect of protection on the 
long-term competitiveness of  the U.S. auto industry. One of the problems in 
carrying out such an analysis is, of course, determining the time horizon over 
which to make the relevant  evaluations. For example, even the static direct 
effects of protection vary fairly considerably over time, primarily as a function 
of  general macroeconomic conditions. We can, however, informally consider 
trends in three essential correlates of competitiveness: wages and labor produc- 
tivity, investment, and quality. With respect to wages, the industry experienced 
a short term gain in the immediate aftermath of the VER by extracting substan- 
tial wage concessions  from the UAW. With the protection  in place, and the 
recovery of profits following the improvement in general macroeconomic con- 
ditions, the UAW was able to negotiate quite generous wage increases in the 
1984 agreements with Ford and General Motors. Given our previous conclu- 
sion that the jump in profits primarily reflects increased rent extraction from 
U.S. consumers, this suggests that the postwar pattern of rent sharing between 
labor and capital in the auto industry continued more or less unchanged. Thus 
it would be difficult to conclude that the industry gained much in terms of its 
relations  with  labor from either  import competition  or the  subsequent pro- 
tection. 
To a considerable extent the senescent industry argument for protection re- 
lies on the protected industry using the period of protection to make fundamen- 
tal adjustments in the organization of production to improve its competitive- 
ness. It is certainly the case that all three U.S. majors have attempted to make 
both physical and organizational changes in response to competition from Jap- 
anese firms. The industry did undertake considerable new capital spending in 
the immediate post-VER period and again in the early  1990s and it is likely 
that these changes have improved its competitiveness, though some of the in- 
vestment in robots and other new technologies has proven disappointing. The 
final dimension related to long-run competitiveness is quality, and the percep- 
tion thereof. At least as important as the industry’s product-mix problems were 
the deterioration in quality and the widespread perception of the U.S. majors 
as suppliers of high-priced, low-quality automobiles. Here the record is mixed. 
By the 1990s the perception of quality seems to have improved. However, an 
analysis of Consumer Reports data on frequency of repair suggests consider- 
able improvement in quality by  Chrysler in the late  1980s and early  1990s, 
while Ford and GM show no clear trend. While there has been some deteriora- 
tion of overall Japanese quality, the most striking fact revealed by this analysis 
is the continuing gap in quality between U.S. and Japanese producers of auto- 
mobiles. 
Overall, there is no question but that the VER resulted in a substantial in- 
crease in industry profits once the U.S. economy recovered from recession and 
auto demand increased. However, it would also appear to be clear that those 
profits primarily reflect increased rent extraction from U.S. consumers. Most 
important, Ford and possibly Chrysler appear to have made substantial adjust- 40  Douglas R.  Nelson 
Table 3.1  Summary Table for Political Economic Analysis 
Time Horizon 
Short  Medium  Long 
~  -  UAW  + 
Ford  0  +  01 - 
Chrysler  0  +  01 - 
GM  0  +  01 - 
Japanese  0  +  + 
Consumers  0  +  - 
ments over the period of the mid- and late- 1980s that have increased their com- 
petitiveness vis-a-vis their Japanese competitors.  It seems reasonable to con- 
clude that the U.S. industry is somewhat smaller, somewhat more flexible, and 
somewhat more efficient. One must, however, be careful in evaluating the rela- 
tionship between  international  competition,  protection,  and  this  improved 
competitiveness. With or without trade protection these firms would have made 
the adjustments in output mix, production facilities, and organization of pro- 
duction. It is Japanese competition, not U.S. protection, that accounts for the 
improvements in performance by the major U.S. auto producers. The Chrysler 
experience is particularly informative when compared to the VER. In the for- 
mer case, the publicness of the transfer and the emphasis on the responsibility 
of the Chrysler Corporation and the UAW for the problems of the firm and the 
solution to those problems created strong incentives to improve performance. 
With the VER, the implication that the problem was (probably unfair) competi- 
tion from abroad created poor incentives to improve performance. Where the 
Chrysler loan was repaid ahead of schedule, the VER, originally intended as a 
three-year measure, dragged on for nearly a decade. 
Table 3.1 provides a very rough summary of this discussion. The participants 
are entered in the table roughly in order of their degree of support for trade 
activism with respect  to Japanese auto producers  (i.e., both  support for the 
VER and domestic content legislation): the UAW and Ford were the most ac- 
tive supporters, with Chrysler holding back during the early period because of 
the loan guarantee and the Carter administration’s opposition to auto protec- 
tion; GM opposed protection, but not very actively; and the Japanese produc- 
ers, and the dealers, opposed protection strongly. Although the consumer inter- 
est was not well represented (except perhaps by the dealers), they are included 
in the table to remind us that they are the source of most of the gains realized 
by the other participants. Because the restraint was not binding in the immedi- 
ate post-VER period, only the UAW experienced any effect. As a result of the 
general economic conditions, the UAW made significant concessions during 
this period. The other agents in the auto industry experienced essentially no 
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and the VER became binding on Japanese firms, all of the active agents gained, 
while the inactive consumers lost. The evaluation of the long run depends on 
two factors: how one evaluates the use that was made by the US.  firms of the 
period during which the VER was binding, and how one evaluates the effect 
of increased Japanese investment in the United States. We have argued above 
that  the former effect appears to be  small positive  to zero, while the  latter 
effect is primarily negative. The entries in the last two cells in the third column 
primarily reflect the effect of a more competitive domestic market. 
3.3  Conclusion: So Why Did They Do It? 
The U.S. automobile industry sought and received protection from Japanese 
competition that was not binding in the short run (for reasons that were widely 
understood  at the time) and whose long-run  economic effects were, at best, 
uncertain.’ The investment of  substantial political resources in seeking fairly 
modest economic gains at a time when there were a variety of more immedi- 
ately productive government actions that could be sought (e.g., regulatory re- 
lief, direct subsidies, relaxation of antitrust enforcement) strongly suggests that 
something other than simple rent seeking was going on. Specifically, Nelson 
(1996) argues that the automobile industry was seeking to reestablish a stable, 
(imperfectly) competitive regime in the US. market by  using state power to 
discipline Japanese competitors. That is, in a reversal of the logic applied in 
much of the economic theory of regulation which sees economic agents seek- 
ing economic goals in the political  system, the auto industry was seeking a 
political goal whose object was the economy. 
If  we refer to the complex set of  arrangements that regulate the relations 
among the various agents that make up the U.S. auto industry as a “sectoral 
regime,” the main institutional members of the regime were the three major 
producers, the UAW, and the various supplier firms. Local, state, and federal 
governments are all heavily involved with the regime as well. While it would 
be wrong to see the auto regime as static, or unconflictual, the basic details of 
the regime were in place not long after the Second World War. The major attri- 
butes of this regime were a stable oligopoly, with GM acting as a price leader, 
and rent sharing between the firms, the UAW, and, to a lesser extent, the sup- 
plier firms. The main source of conflict in the regime was primarily over the 
distribution of the oligopolistic rents. However, as long as the regime remained 
fairly  stable, such conflicts  were relatively  minor and well institutionalized. 
For a variety of reasons, the surging Japanese imports in the mid- and late- 
1970s could not be managed by the industry (as European imports in the late 
1950s and early 1960s had been) and threatened the foundations of the regime. 
In response, the US.  industry  sought protection not primarily  for short-run 
7. The uncertainty of the long-run effects derived primarily from the effects on investment in the 
United States by the Japanese majors and questions about the long-run sustainability of protection. 42  Douglas R.  Nelson 
rent-seeking reasons but as part of  an attempt to reconstitute the auto regime 
on more or less the same terms as had existed prior to the import shock. 
Ultimately, however, this political effort to recreate a particular  economic 
order failed. One of the striking things about the auto story is that, while the 
auto industry  got more or less what it wanted from the state, it was the U.S. 
industry, not the Japanese industry, that did the adjusting. Competition in the 
auto industry  is now global competition. Given international sourcing strate- 
gies, multinational investment, joint ventures,  and captive imports, even the 
meaning of a “national” industry has become unclear. The US.  auto industry’s 
attempt to resist this reality ultimately failed.8  That is, the protection may have 
delayed the adjustment by a matter of five or six years, at considerable cost to 
the consumer, but the result is a global auto regime. The continued viability of 
GM, Ford, and Chrysler depends on their ability to adjust to this new reality 
and to participate in the creation of a political-economic regime that does not 
rely on the policy actions of a single national government, even one as power- 
ful as the United  state^.^ 
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